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A Taxonomy of Methodological Approaches
in Recent Canadian Legal History
SINCE THE EMERGENCE OF LEGAL HISTORY as a sub-field of Canadian
history in the late 1970s, a number of scholars have published reviews and
historiographical essays discussing the state of legal-historical scholarship in Canada.
Early review articles were calls to arms. They argued that legal history was a
potentially valuable area of historical inquiry and warned of the dangers of “internal”
legal history – the study of legal doctrines and institutions isolated from social
context.1 More recently, with a growing body of work that frequently draws heavily
from social and cultural history (and thus avoids the internal legal history critique),
scholars writing review essays have evaluated the steady stream of publications
rolling out of the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History and the University of
Toronto Press as well as the occasional volume published by other academic presses.
These authors identify remaining gaps in the historiography, but are generally pleased
by the continued growth of the field.2 Thus, while as late as 1992 Greg Marquis
declared in Acadiensis that legal history was “one of the most neglected branches of
social history in Canada” that was “[i]gnored by mainstream journals and
conferences”,3 John McLaren recently asserted that Canadian legal history has “come
of age”4 – a point substantiated by the Canadian Historical Association’s decision to
award Jerry Bannister’s study of law and government in Newfoundland with the Sir
1 See, for example, R.C.B. Risk, “A Prospectus for Canadian Legal History”, Dalhousie Law Journal,
1 (1973), pp. 227-45; Graham Parker, “The Masochism of the Legal Historian”, University of Toronto
Law Journal, 24 (1974), pp. 279-317; David H. Flaherty, “Writing Canadian Legal History: An
Introduction”, in David H. Flaherty, ed., Essays in the History of Canadian Law, Volume I (Toronto,
1981), pp. 3-42; André Morel, “Canadian Legal History – Retrospect and Prospect”, Osgoode Hall
Law Journal, 21, 2 (1983), pp. 159-64; Barry Wright, “Towards a New Canadian Legal History”,
Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 22, 2 (1984), pp. 349-74; D.G. Bell, “The Birth of Canadian Legal
History”, University of New Brunswick Law Journal, 33 (1984), pp. 312-8; and Brian Young, “Law
‘in the Round’”, Acadiensis, XVI, 1 (1986), pp. 155-65.
2 See, for example, M.H. Ogilvie, “Recent Developments in Canadian Law: Legal History”, Ottawa
Law Review, 19, 1 (1987), pp. 225-54; John P.S. McLaren, “The Legal Historian, Masochist or
Missionary? A Canadian’s Reflections”, Legal Education Review, 5 (1994), pp. 67-104; John P.S.
McLaren,“Meeting the Challenges of Canadian Legal History: the Albertan Contribution”, Alberta
Law Review, 32 (1994), pp. 423-35; Jim Phillips, “Crime and Punishment in the Dominion of the
North: Canada from New France to the Present”, in Clive Emsley and Louis A. Knafla, eds., Crime
History and Histories of Crime: Studies in the Historiography of Crime and Criminal Justice
(Westport, Connecticut, 1996), pp. 163-99; Jamie Benidickson, “Survey of Canadian Legal History
in the ‘90s”, Ottawa Law Review, 28, 2 (1996-1997), pp. 433-65; Jim Phillips, “Recent Publications
in Canadian Legal History”, Canadian Historical Review, 78, 2 (1997), pp. 236-57; Margaret
McCallum, “Canadian Legal History in the late 1990s: A Field in Search of Fences?”, Acadiensis,
XXVII, 2 (1998), pp. 151-66; W. Wesley Pue, “‘Where History Actually Happened’: The Pursuit of
Canadian Legal History”, in DeLloyd Guth and W. Wesley Pue, eds., Canada’s Legal Inheritances
(Winnipeg, 2001), pp. xv-xxvi.
3 Greg Marquis, “Law, Society and History: Whose Frontier?”, Acadiensis, XXI, 2 (1992), p.162.
4 John McLaren, “In the Northern Archives Something Stirred: The Discovery of Canadian Legal
History”, Australian Journal of Legal History, 7, 1 (2003), p. 86.
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John A. Macdonald Prize as the best book published on Canadian history in 2003.5
The time thus seems appropriate to take stock of the approaches Canadian legal
historians have employed in their work. While the authors of previous review essays
tended to structure their analyses around topics in legal history, in this essay I
undertake a slightly different approach in examining five recently published books on
Canadian legal history: David Murray, Colonial Justice: Justice, Morality, and Crime
in the Niagara District, 1791-1849 (Toronto, University of Toronto and Osgoode
Society, 2002); Patrick Brode, Courted and Abandoned: Seduction in Canadian Law
(Toronto, University of Toronto Press and Osgoode Society, 2002); Judy Fudge and
Eric Tucker, Labour Before the Law: The Regulation of Workers’ Collective Action
in Canada, 1900-1948 (Toronto, Oxford University Press and Osgoode Society,
2001); Constance Backhouse and Nancy Backhouse. The Heiress vs the
Establishment: Mrs. Campbell’s Campaign for Legal Justice (Vancouver, University
of British Columbia Press and Osgoode Society, 2004); and Carolyn Strange and Tina
Loo, True Crime, True North: The Golden Age of Canadian Pulp Magazines
(Vancouver, Raincoast Books, 2004). This essay will consider these books by
classifying their methodological approach, introducing the basic aspects of each
approach and considering how each publication embodies their particular
methodology.
What taxonomy for this analysis, however, is most appropriate? I will draw upon
a very useful classification of legal history scholarship employed by Harvard Law
School professor William (“Terry”) Fisher III.6 Fisher divides legal history into six
categories (some with several subcategories): 1) descriptive economic analysis, 2)
styles of legal thought, 3) progressive evolutionary functionalism, 4) narrative, 5)
dialectical materialism and 6) intellectual legal history. My intentional use of an
American scholar’s taxonomy invites comparisons between Canadian and American
legal history. A full comparison is too large an issue to be addressed in this review,
but I will note a few obvious differences.
For some parts of Fisher’s taxonomy there is little or no equivalent Canadian
scholarship. This is especially true for the descriptive economic analysis approach
which, at its basic level, argues that legal rules, such as those in contract and tort law,
have developed toward pre-ordained and allocatively-efficient ends. This is different
than a normative analysis of law, which suggests that judges and legislators need to
change the law to encourage economic efficiency; instead, it says that the law does
change to become efficient by ensuring that consumers are satisfied. “Mistakes” in
legal developments occur when legislatures get involved, meddling with the invisible
hand of the market. This approach emphasizes private property and freedom of
contract. Its most well-known American proponent is Richard Posner, formerly a
University of Chicago law professor and currently a member of the United States
5 Jerry Bannister, The Rule of the Admirals: Law, Custom, and Naval Government in Newfoundland,
1699-1832 (Toronto, 2003).
6 Fisher has not published the entirety of this taxonomy, though part of it may be found in William W.
Fisher III, “Texts and Contexts: The Application to American Legal History of the Methodologies of
Intellectual History”, Stanford Law Review, 49, 5 (1997), pp.1065-110. My description of Fisher’s
entire classification also draws from his Harvard Law School course “American Legal History, 1760-
1900”, which I had the pleasure of auditing in 2000.
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Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (appointed by Ronald Reagan).7 The dearth
of Canadian scholarship representing this approach likely stems from the fact that few
law faculties in Canada have adopted the law and economics form of legal analysis
popular in several politically conservative American law schools such as the
University of Chicago and the University of Virginia.
The second approach to legal history is “styles of legal thought”. This is essentially
a form of internal legal history that explains the development of the law by linking
legal change to broad shifts in the ways in which lawyers think about the law. This
approach is often used in the context of American constitutional law scholarship. It
has fewer adherents in Canada, probably because this type of historical inquiry was
already on the wane in the United States when Canadian legal history began to take
root. Nevertheless, some examples of this approach exist in Canada including R.C.B.
Risk’s essays on the effect of Canadian legal thought on the interpretation of the
British North America Act.8
“Progressive evolutionary functionalism” has been a very common approach to
legal history in both the United States and Canada. In the American context, it was
marked traditionally by teleology (i.e., the natural movement of society in the direction
of welfare capitalism and representative democracy), a functional theory of law, and
analogies to Darwinian evolution. The basic idea is that law develops with society. For
example, an historian employing a progressive evolutionary functionalist approach in
examining injuries among 19th-century industrial workers would assert that 18th-
century legal doctrines proved to be ineffective protections for people employed in the
dangerous factories of 19th-century England and the United States. Lawyers and
judges thus responded by developing legal principles that helped society progress by
protecting workers. Scholars keen to avoid the dangers of internal legal history often
turn towards functional explanations. The relative strength of this approach lies in its
ability to connect legal developments to social, cultural and economic contexts. At
their worst, however, functionalist interpretations provide generalized explanations to
address historical causation while leaving unexplored the specific details of why and
how change occurred in a particular way in a particular place.
Although some Canadian scholars also employ functionalist explanations for legal-
historical developments, the “progressive” aspect is usually absent. David Murray
avoids falling back on grand social and economic factors in his fine book on the pre-
Confederation justice system in Upper Canada, Colonial Justice: Justice, Morality,
and Crime in the Niagara District, 1791-1849. Murray examines the local
7 See, for example, Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 4th ed. (Boston, 1992). See also
Jenny Bourne Wahl’s book, The Bondsman’s Burden: An Economic Analysis of the Common Law of
Southern Slavery (New York, 1998), in which she argues that the law of slavery developed by
Southern judges in the antebellum period was efficient from the standpoint of slave masters in that it
served to maximize the wealth of slave owners by developing rules that served their welfare. More
subtle and nuanced versions of economic analysis explore the ways in which small communities
created local and informal legal systems that ensured the protection of limited resources. See, for
example, Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Cambridge, MA,
1991).
8 See, for example, R.C.B. Risk, “Canadian Courts Under the Influence”, University of Toronto Law
Journal, 40 (1990), pp. 687-737.
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administration of the criminal law in the Niagara district of Upper Canada from the
establishment of the colony in 1791 to the elimination of districts as the primary
administrative units of local government in 1849. Murray provides a detailed
overview of the Niagara district’s economy, geography and demographics and then
describes the institutional framework of the justice system, explores the connection
between Christian morality and the legal system, investigates the challenges posed to
law enforcement by the close proximity of the American border for certain crimes and
reviews the social and legal attitudes toward fugitive slaves.
Murray often explains changes in the colonial justice system by pointing to larger
historical forces affecting the Niagara District such as immigration. He stresses that
the Upper Canadian criminal justice system gradually drifted away from the English-
inspired model desired by the colony’s first governor, John Graves Simcoe, in
response to local concerns about race, gender, Christian morality, personal safety and
economic developments. Murray makes explicit the functionalist aspects of his study
in his introduction when he suggests that “[l]ocal conditions in the Niagara district
moulded the environment in which the transplanted English system of law emerged in
the new colony and they certainly influenced how it was administered”.9 In
commenting upon the gradually declining roles of magistrates and grand juries in
local government, he notes later in the book “the issues faced by the local magistrates
became more complex”, and “as a steady stream of immigrants arrived in the colony,
the strains in the system became increasingly evident, even to those in charge”.10 The
strength of Murray’s functionalist explanations lie in his detailed study of one
relatively small jurisdiction in Upper Canada, which allows him to examine closely
the effects of broader social forces on the legal system; he does not simply invoke
“social context” in a general way to explain developments.
Patrick Brode also relies on functionalist arguments in Courted and Abandoned:
Seduction in Canadian Law, though the explication of historical causation is less
persuasive. Brode examines how the courts dealt with “seduction” in 19th- and 20th-
century Canada. He includes discussions of several causes of action, including
criminal conversation, breach of promise of marriage and the tort of seduction, the last
of which a father could use to recover damages for the loss of his daughter’s
“services”. This tort, Brode claims, was especially important in colonial Upper
Canada, where the lack of poor laws resulted in efforts to secure financial assistance
from delinquent lovers through seduction claims. Brode argues that to understand the
application of the tort of seduction it is necessary to appreciate rural society in Upper
Canada, as the dispersed communities meant that young people “had limited
opportunities to meet a potential mate and were probably tempted to make the most
of infrequent opportunities”.11 Actions for seduction, he argues, only began to decline
in Canada with greater urbanization, increased government involvement in child
welfare and changing attitudes towards men and women as equal partners in marriage.
He points out that by the 1960s seduction and its related actions “seemed inconsistent
with reality”.12 In comparison to Murray’s detailed attempt to demonstrate how local
9 Murray, Colonial Justice, p. 5.
10 Murray, Colonial Justice, p. 219.
11 Brode, Courted and Abandoned, p. 13.
12 Brode, Courted and Abandoned, p. 188.
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social and economic changes affected the colonial justice system, Brode’s efforts to
address historical causation are overdrawn, in part because he attempts to explain
legal changes throughout Canada yet draws his research materials predominantly
from Ontario. In addition, he is reluctant to explore the role of gender inequality in his
consideration of the interactions between men and women.
In tackling issues of historical causation, some legal historians have employed the
insights of the “dialectical materialism” approach, Fisher’s fourth methodology. This
approach includes several sub-categories, but all involve the relationship between
class and legal change. One version of this approach, for example, portrays the law
simply as a vehicle of domination and exploitation. In this sub-category, law is
perceived as a weapon in class struggles.13 A second variation of the dialectical
materialism approach is “law as vehicle of legitimation/class hegemony”. This is a
more subtle argument that explores the use of law as rhetoric to validate legal systems
that benefit the capitalist classes. Here, emphasis is placed on the role of law in
making the lower classes, despite their resistance, internalize values that lead them to
accept their economic positions. It inquires as to why the majority of citizens accepted
an economic and social system that encouraged inequality and, in answering,
concludes that law helped obscure the oppressive social and economic order.14
The more nuanced version of the dialectical materialism approach is applied in
Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker’s Labour Before the Law: The Regulation of Workers’
Collective Action in Canada, 1900-1948. Fudge and Tucker are interested primarily
in “industrial legality” in the first half of the 20th century – that is, in the interaction
between the law, workers, employers and the state that defined acceptable collective
action in industrial relations. Fudge and Tucker suggest that labour law changed to
assist the growth of industrial capitalism, but they draw from intellectual history
(which I will discuss later) in saying that they focus on the role of discourse “in setting
up categories that delimit the realm of legitimate claims, organize those claims in
particular ways, and privilege some claims over others”.15 They also emphasize the
importance of the resistance of workers, pointing out that “discourse and the
construction of identities are contested and their production is not the exclusive
domain of privileged speakers and state institutions”. Thus, just as workers “resist
their commodification, their consciousness cannot be moulded and shaped
conveniently so that they automatically accept their own subordination”.16
Fudge and Tucker set out three stages to industrial legality in Canada.17 They
suggest that “liberal voluntarism” prevailed before 1907. The common law
13 An example of this is Morton Horwitz’s argument that courts adopted a new tort rule, the so-called
fellow servant rule, which limited the responsibility of 19th-century industrialists for injuries to
employees caused in part by another employee. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of
American Law, 1780-1860 (Cambridge, MA, 1977), pp. 207-10.
14 See, for example, R.W. Kostal, “Legal Justice, Social Justice: An Incursion into the Social History of
Work-Related Accident Law in Ontario, 1860-86”, Law and History Review, 6,1 (1988), pp. 1-22.
15 Fudge and Tucker, Labour Before the Law, p. 6.
16 Fudge and Tucker, Labour Before the Law, p. 9.
17 They define a regime of industrial legality as “a set of institutions that define and enforce a
constellation of rights, which in turn govern and mediate relations between workers and employers.
Rights in this sense are always political and social in that they are claims recognized by the state that
define relations between people”. See Fudge and Tucker, Labour Before the Law, p. 10.
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established a legal regime based upon contract and property, but employers rarely
used legal institutions to deal with workers’ collective action and governments
infrequently attempted to conciliate labour disputes. Fudge and Tucker’s second
period, “industrial voluntarism”, began when the Canadian government passed the
Industrial Disputes Investigation Act, 1907. It was marked by increased labour
activity, a greater amount of government involvement in the labour market and an
increased willingness by employers to use the legal system against organized labour.
The third period distinguished by Fudge and Tucker, “industrial pluralism”, began
during the Second World War when increased trade union activity encouraged the
recognition of organized labour as an important player in the war effort. In exchange
for labour peace during the war, freedom of association for the purpose of collective
bargaining became an enforceable right. In gaining these rights, however, the labour
movement gave up its ability to call wildcat strikes and “accepted the legitimacy of
private property and free enterprise” while undertaking a “commitment to
constitutionalism and electoral change”.18
Labour Before the Law is an impressive volume. It draws together the immense
legal and historical scholarship on law, labour and the state in Canada, offering a truly
national analysis. Unlike some other histories that use “Canada” in their title but offer
a narrative focusing heavily on one jurisdiction (usually Ontario), Fudge and Tucker
discuss the development of industrial legality in every province of the country – even
Newfoundland before it entered Confederation in 1949. One weakness of Labour
Before the Law is shared by many works writing within the dialectical materialism
approach. In describing how law serves as a vehicle to legitimate the existing
economic order, Fudge and Tucker are careful to point out in their introduction that
they do not see the history of labour relations in the first half of the 20th century as
progressing from bad to good (as in the “progressive” evolutionary functionalist
model) – it is not “a tale of linear progress from dark beginnings to the triumph of
industrial democracy and freedom of association”.19 Their narrative, however, seems
predetermined in the opposite way as a story of failed resistance to changing forms of
state and corporate control over labour. The theoretical framework offered by the
authors leaves little room for an alterative ending. That they will see the transition
from industrial voluntarism to industrial pluralism as one with dark overtones is clear
from the outset of the study.
Another quibble is that, despite the book’s title, one might be surprised by the lack
of law in Labour and the Law. Fudge and Tucker spend little time breaking down
judicial decisions or carefully analyzing the social and economic backgrounds of the
judges and lawyer-politicians who shaped legislation and litigation. Judges are usually
faceless, and their views are imputed more than proved; Fudge and Tucker simply
offer comments such as “[o]n the whole, judges remained hostile to the collective
action of workers”.20 Another example is when they suggest that the role and
importance of juries declined because it was easier for judges to issue injunctions or
to convict labour leaders by deciding legal issues summarily: “Eliminating trial by
18 Fudge and Tucker, Labour Before the Law, p. 305.
19 Fudge and Tucker, Labour Before the Law, p. 4.
20 Fudge and Tucker, Labour Before the Law, p. 198.
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jury not only allowed employers to get criminal sanctions imposed quickly, but it also
increased the chances of securing a conviction”.21 The authors, though, provide little
direct evidence that individual judges espoused this rationale in limiting the
availability of jury trials.
Fisher’s fifth approach to legal history – “narrative” – takes several forms, but is
at its most effective in the study of gender and race histories using court records.
Among the formats employed in this approach are stories told by people in the past
about their own lives and/or about their experiences with the law (such as stories told
in courts); stories told by people in the past about other people’s lives and/or about
others’ experiences with the law (i.e., early-20th-century progressive reformers’
discussions of how legal reforms benefited the working class); fictional stories written
by people in the past (such as reformers telling stories of “fallen” women); synopses
put together by historians of the experiences of individual people in the past; and
composite stories of people in the past (i.e., experiences of women with divorce
law).22
The narrative approach has several strengths: it provides insights into cultural
forces affecting law; it offers a sense of the law in action (i.e., how individuals
manipulated legal forms to achieve their own ends); it clarifies the relationship
between legal and non-legal systems of norms (i.e., how religion and law intertwine
to shape people’s self-image and actions); it presents a source of emphatic
understanding and of political illumination and inspiration; and, finally, it is a source
of complexity and nuance. Constance Backhouse and Nancy L. Backhouse provide an
excellent example of the narrative approach in The Heiress vs the Establishment: Mrs.
Campbell’s Campaign for Legal Justice.23 This fascinating volume is anchored in the
middle by a complete reprinting of Elizabeth Bethune Campbell’s book, Where
Angels Fear to Tread, which she self-published in 1940. Campbell relates first-hand
her attempts to enforce what she believed to be her late mother’s will and to
demonstrate that the trustee of her mother’s estate had misappropriated trust funds for
his own personal use. The daughter of a noted Ontario lawyer, Campbell pursued her
claims despite persistent resistance from many members of the bench and bar of the
province. After failing to receive any substantial award from several Ontario courts,
she appealed her case to the Judicial Council of the Privy Council in London.
Although she was not herself a lawyer, Campbell became the first women to argue
before the Privy Council. Even more amazing, she won, though continued litigation
ultimately sapped the victory of any substantial financial gain. To help keep track of
the complex web of individuals and legal proceedings that stretched over ten years,
Backhouse and Backhouse include a useful description of people mentioned by
21 Fudge and Tucker, Labour Before the Law, p. 27.
22 For an American example, see Carol Weisbrod, “Divorce Stories: Readings, Comments, and
Questions on Law and Narrative”, Brigham Young University Law Review (1991), pp. 143-96.
23 The narrative approach is also employed to good use in Constance Backhouse, Colour-Coded: A
Legal History of Racism in Canada, 1900-1950 (Toronto, 1999) and James W. St. G. Walker,
“Race”, Rights and the Law in the Supreme Court of Canada: Historical Case Studies (Waterloo,
1997). Both Backhouse and Walker employ a series of detailed case studies of how individuals faced
legal oppression. They use their narratives to examine Canadians’ attitudes towards race and how
those attitudes affected the legal system.
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Campbell and an appendix detailing the sequence of legal cases.
Backhouse and Backhouse add a lengthy introduction and epilogue in which they
evaluate Campbell’s story. The result is a work that draws upon all the strengths of a
narrative approach to legal history. Campbell’s story certainly serves as a source of
political inspiration. Backhouse and Backhouse point out that, despite the roadblocks
placed in her way, Campbell succeeded because she was a woman “of formidable
intellect, wit, and sarcasm, with the determination of steel”.24 The Heiress vs the
Establishment also provides insights into cultural forces affecting law. Backhouse and
Backhouse suggest, for instance, that assumptions about gender shaped the reactions
of several Ontario lawyers towards Campbell, for the lawyers seemed “astonished at
the ways in which she breached customary gender boundaries”.25 The study also helps
clarify the relationship between legal and non-legal systems of norms. Campbell felt
motivated by an intense “Britishness”, for example, a characteristic that “may have
struck the London legal officials as quaintly endearing and very probably enhanced
her prospects for success”.26
A common critique of the narrative approach is that most stories are drawn from
the “victims” of the legal system, a fact that suggests that historians do not choose
representative stories. Backhouse and Backhouse acknowledge this potential pitfall as
they turn a critical eye to some of Campbell’s claims and recognize the unusual
aspects of the case and Campbell’s social position. In introducingWhere Angels Fear
to Tread, they ask, to choose two examples, “Was Mrs. Campbell an unreasonable,
even querulous client, dangerously obsessed by the case?” and “Did Mrs. Campbell’s
status as a woman from a white, upper-middle-class, prominent legal family affect her
treatment?”27 In answer to these questions they argue that she was sometimes a
“stereotypical querulous law client”, who had become “psychologically enveloped” in
her case.28 They also argue that her “upper-class stature was central to her success”
and that only gender made her an outsider in the eyes of the Ontario legal elite.29
Backhouse and Backhouse, furthermore, offer a nuanced and complex portrait of
Campbell and her protagonists in examining Campbell’s assertions that most of the
legal profession refused to assist her because they formed a tightly-knit “family
compact”, the members of which were unwilling to criticize one another despite
ample proof of inappropriate and perhaps illegal actions. Backhouse and Backhouse
note the gross instances of unfairness meted out to Campbell, but suggest that lawyers
and judges probably “acted separately, unreflectively, even instinctively, to protect
one of their own against what they perceived to be an unfair attack”.30
The final approach in Fisher’s classification is “intellectual legal history”.
Informed by the “linguistic turn”, legal historians using an intellectual history
approach sometimes have more trouble talking to law professors and lawyers (who
are interested in legal doctrine and policy considerations) than to other historians. The
24 Backhouse and Backhouse, The Heiress vs the Establishment, p. 3.
25 Backhouse and Backhouse, The Heiress vs the Establishment, p. 199.
26 Backhouse and Backhouse, The Heiress vs the Establishment, p. 180.
27 Backhouse and Backhouse, The Heiress vs the Establishment, p. 23.
28 Backhouse and Backhouse, The Heiress vs the Establishment, p. 214, 223.
29 Backhouse and Backhouse, The Heiress vs the Establishment, p. 179.
30 Backhouse and Backhouse, The Heiress vs the Establishment, p. 199.
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intellectual history banner flies above at least four sub-categories. While the length of
this review prevents a detailed examination of these sub-fields, a few words can be
said about each. “Structuralist” legal history has the work of Michel Foucalt as its
intellectual foundation; it aims to map the deep structures of language that provide the
vocabulary and thus shape the beliefs of citizens. “Contextualist” legal history
suggests that the meaning of a document is radically dependant on the context and
thus “the central job of the intellectual historian is to reconstruct that context and then
to interpret the text in light of it”.31 Usually examining canonical texts, contextualists
look to shed new meaning on the beliefs and world-view of the historical authors. The
third sub-category of intellectual history is “postmodern” or “textualist”. Legal
historians using this approach believe that every historical document produces not
one, but multiple possible (and valid) interpretations. It differs from the contextualist
approach in that postmodern analysis does not necessarily believe that examining the
context of a historical document will lead the historian closer to the “real” meaning or
best interpretation.32 Fourth, the “law in cultural context” or “new historicism” sub-
category is also aware that texts are ambiguous, but it is more interested in the cultural
and ideological contexts of the texts. Unlike the contextualist approach, however, new
historicism is not drawn toward the analysis of canonical texts, but examines small
events that are suggestive of larger social codes and logics.33 Each of these approaches
to intellectual history has subtle strengths and weaknesses. Contextualism is useful,
for example, in explaining historical causation, re-enacting past experiences and
seeking the original meaning of events. Textualism, meanwhile, helps liberate the
political imagination and adds an element of “play” to the study of legal history.34
Some Canadian scholars of the law and society have adopted these intellectual
history approaches. As mentioned, Fudge and Tucker are interested in discourse in
their study of labour and law.35 A very different book, though one which also accepts
the linguistic turn, is Carolyn Strange and Tina Loo’s True Crime, True North: The
31 Fisher, “Texts and Contexts”, p. 1068.
32 This sub-category is most at odds with Patrick Brode’s Courted and Abandoned, in which Brode
suggests that historians can, and must, objectively view the actions and motivations of historical
actors. He thus argues that an 1837 seduction law should not be deconstructed such that it is deemed
to be “a paternal attempt to control women”, for he says this conclusion “is to impose modern
concepts on the past”. Rather, he argues that the statute “should be accepted for what it was – a well-
intentioned but futile attempt to extend relief to the unwed mother”. He further suggests that
historians should not impose “modern political judgments on an earlier period”, and it is “far more
relevant to evaluate the seduction cases by objectively viewing the lives of men and women caught
up in the vagaries of the law”. Unfortunately, Brode’s appeal for objectivity leads to unrealistic
accounts of “designing women”, who launched malicious suits on false claims and of good-hearted
male politicians whose legislation accidentally disadvantaged women. See Brode, Courted and
Abandoned, p. 207.
33 See, for example, Hendrik Hartog, “Pigs and Positivism”, Wisconsin Law Review (1985), pp. 899-
935.
34 For a further discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of these approaches in intellectual legal
history see Fisher, “Texts and Contexts”.
35 Another example is Mariana Valverde, who draws heavily from Foucalt in her challenging and
illuminating book on moral reform in English Canada in the late-19th and early-20th centuries. See
Mariana Valverde, The Age of Light, Soap, and Water: Moral Reform in English Canada, 1885-1925
(Toronto, 1991).
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Golden Age of Canadian Pulp Magazines which examines the heyday of true crime
magazines published in Canada during the 1940s before their ultimate decline in the
1950s. The magazines offered stories of Canadian crimes and how authorities caught
and punished perpetrators. Canadian magazines such as Feature Detective Cases and
True Police Cases carved a niche for themselves when the government in Ottawa
banned the importation of similar pulp magazines from the United States in 1940.
Accompanied by melodramatic drawings and staged photographs, the magazines used
images to create a sense of sexual innuendo, although the narratives themselves were
moralistic and sexual violence was only inferred.
Strange and Loo make several brief allusions to the broader social and economic
contexts of these “crime pulps”. They suggest, for example, that the popularity of
crime stories derived from the fact that they were cheap diversions from domestic
economic troubles and foreign wars. Strange and Loo’s interest, however, is really in
the text (and images) of the magazines and their implicit meanings and not in the
context of the magazines and their stories. Strange and Loo thus demonstrate little
interest in the stated intentions of the pulp writers; they concern themselves, instead,
with the ways in which authors used language to emphasize particular social and
cultural ideas concerning gender, race, class and ethnicity. True Crime, True North
reflects the influence of intellectual history in several ways. Strange and Loo read
against the grain of the record to look for unstated but implicit meaning, examining
not only the text of crime stories but the messages implicit in the advertisements
scattered in the magazines. These messages embody a series of unambiguous moral
and social lessons: justice should always be an eye for an eye, the deadly sins
motivated criminal activity and people of certain races and ethnicities were prone to
particular types of criminal behaviour. Strange and Loo also conclude that the stories
taught that sex killers were simply motivated by their “healthy male lust” and that,
when police killed, it was not “revenge” but “vengeance” – “a word that had religious
connotations and linked the lawmen’s actions to that of a wrathful God”.36 True
Crime, True North sheds light on fascinating and often humorous topics, is filled with
colourful images and is aimed at a readership broader than the academic community.
Nevertheless, the book would have been strengthened if Strange and Loo had been
explicit about their methodological approach and had explored alternative possible
interpretations of these texts.
There is no “right” way to study legal history and, as this essay suggests, legal
historians currently employ various methodologies, each with their own tendencies,
strengths and weaknesses. Three of these methodologies are teleological, evolutionary
theories (progressive evolutionary functionalism, dialectical materialism and
descriptive economic analysis of law) while styles of legal thought, narrative and
intellectual legal history do not share this tendency. These methodologies also differ
in their relative concern with ideology: styles of legal thought, dialectical materialism
and intellectual history all reflect a strong interest in ideology whereas progressive
evolutionary functionalism, descriptive economic analysis of law and narrative
approaches are normally less interested in it. Many scholars, of course, employ more
than one approach in their work, either by intentionally melding interpretative
36 Strange and Loo, True Crime, True North, pp. 90, 24.
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frameworks or by unintentionally combining them in process of “doing history”. In
addition to his use of functionalist explanations, for example, David Murray employs
a narrative approach in devoting a chapter to the experiences of women and African
Canadian victims of crime on the grounds that integrating “the stories of ordinary
individuals and their experiences with the legal administration” can “better illuminate
how the justice system actually worked”.37
As the field has grown it seems less and less necessary to implore young scholars
to undertake work in legal history. The study of legal history in Canada is obviously
alive and well. The spectrum of topics and approaches examined in this review reflect
the richness of current work – a richness that probably results from the multi-
disciplinary tendencies of legal history, which attracts scholars whose academic
backgrounds includes law, sociology, political science, criminology and, of course,
history. The diversity of topics and approaches also suggests that we should spend
little time attempting to define what is, and what is not, legal history as scholars will
continue to investigate topics related to the law and the legal system using whichever
methodological approach they find most useful. It is more important that young
scholars entering the discipline appreciate that “doing” legal history necessitates
choices in methodology that affect every scholar’s ability to answer some questions
while leaving others unexplored.
R. BLAKE BROWN
37 Murray, Colonial Justice, p. 6.
